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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-TREATIES-EFFECT

NATIONS CHARTER UPON

OF THE UNITED

INCONSISTENT STATE LAWS.

The United Nations Charter was ratified by the President of the
United States with the advice and consent of the Senate in 1945.1 Several cases have discussed the effect of the Charter on the municipal (i.e.,
internal) law of the United States, 2 the most famous of which is the California District Court of Appeals' decision in Sei Fujii v. State.3 There
the lower court held that the United Nations Charter invalidated the California Alien Land Laws. 4 However, the California Supreme Court expressly rejected the lower court's holding that the United Nations Charter
applied, and affirmed the decision on the basis that the Alien Land Laws
were invalid under the fourteenth amendment.
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the effect of the United
Nations Charter, as a treaty negotiated by the Executive and advised for
ratification by tle Senate, upon inconsistent state laws and to suggest the
need for a constitutional amendment to clarify and limit such effect. An
analysis will be made of the history of treaties and the cases decided which
have involved an application of the United Nations Charter. Proposed
remedies will be examined and a solution offered.
I.
EFFECT OF TREATIES GENERALLY.

The United States Constitution 5 provides that treaties made pursuant
to the authority of the United States shall be "the supreme law of the
land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby." The only
limitation to the treaty power appears to be that the United States may
not do by treaty that which is expressly forbidden by the Constitution.6
The broadness of the scope of the treaty power was exemplified by the case
1. The Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of
Justice were advised for ratification by the Senate on July 28, 1945, and ratified
by the President on August 8, 1945. 59 STAT. 1031 (1945).
2. See text accompanying notes 19-34 infra.
3. 217 P.2d 481 (Cal. App. 1950), aff'd, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
4. Cal. Stats. 1921, p. 93.
5. U. S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
6. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890) (dictum).

(100)
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of Missouri v. Holland7 where the Supreme Court, although it had held
similar acts prior to the treaty unconstitutional, sustained an act of Congress
implementing a treaty with Great Britain concerning the protection of
migratory birds passing between Canada and the United States. It should
be noted that no treaty has been held to be unconstitutional by the courts.8
A provision in a treaty may be incorporated into the municipal law
of the United States so as to supersede inconsistent earlier acts of Congress
and inconsistent state legislation. 9 The United States is the only commonlaw country where it is possible for a treaty to become part of the municipal
law without an implementing act of the legislative body. In England, for
example, before a treaty can become part of the municipal law it must be
implemented by Parliament.' ° In the early case of Ware v. Hylton" the
United States Supreme Court declared a law of Virginia void as violative
of the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain of 1783. The Treaty had given
British creditors the right to recover debts contracted in the United States
before the treaty was ratified. The Virginia statute that was declared void
provided that these payments escheated to the State of Virginia. Thus, it
follows, that state law and state public policy in conflict with a treaty are
superseded thereby. In United States v. Belmont, 12 the court stated:
"Plainly, the external powers of the United States are to be exercised without regard to state laws or policies. The supremacy of a
treaty in this respect has been recognized from the beginning

when judicial
constitutions,
and decision.
an obstacle to

. . .

and

authority is invoked in aid of such consummation, state
state laws and state policies are irrelevant to the inquiry
It is inconceivable that any of them can be interposed as
the effective operation of a federal constitutional power."

However, there is the qualification that only self-executing treaties
will effectually supersede inconsistent state laws, i.e., will be enforced by
the courts. The origin of the distinction between self-executing and non
self-executing treaties dates from Chief Justice Marshall's statement in
Foster v. Neilson1 3 where he said:
"Our Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land.
It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent
to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the
aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation
7. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
8. See DEVLIN, THE TREATY POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 128 (1908) ; Rix, Human Rights and International Law: Effect of the Cov-

enant Under our Constitution, 35 A.B.A.J. 551 (1949).
9. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) ; Bacardi Corp. of America v. Domenich,
311 U.S. 150 (1940).
10. See Rix, supra note 8.
11. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
12. 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937).
13. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
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import a contract - when either of the parties engages to perform
a particular act - the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the
judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the court."
It is submitted that Foster v. Neilson is an extremely weak foundation for
the distinction between self-executing and non self-executing treaties, even
though this doctrine has now acquired considerable support in later cases. 4
In the Foster case, the Supreme Court held that the provision of the
Florida Purchase Treaty dealing with the ownership of land in the territory ceded to the United States by Spain was not self-executing because
it was in the form of an executory contract and because the scope of the
ceded territory was a political question. In the later case of United States
5
v. Percheman"
the very same Court held that it had been in error in the
Foster case, and that after examining the Spanish text of the treaty, it
had decided that the treaty was self-executing, or in other words, part of
the municipal law of the United States. It is incredible to believe that the
Spanish text was clearer to the Supreme Court than the English text that
was used to decide the Foster case. A seemingly valid conclusion to be
drawn from the two cases is that there is little authority for the distinction
between self-executing and non self-executing treaties.
The treaty itself may avoid this problem by containing an express
statement that it is or is not to be self-executing, and this statement will
be binding on the courts by virtue of the constitutional provision regarding
treaties.' 0 In the absence of such a declaration, the courts will consider
the intention of the contracting parties as manifested by the language of
the document, its subject matter, and the circumstances under which it
was executed.
It has been held that a single treaty may contain both kinds of provisions, some which are self-executing and some which are not selfexecuting. 17 In practice, the doctrine of non self-executing treaties has
been applied only to preserve the constitutional rights of the political organs
of the federal government, especially the House of Representatives which
does not normally participate in treaty-making, in matters which for historical or practical reasons have been considered peculiarly within the
competence of these organs. For example, treaty provisions referring to
appropriations of money, to tariffs, to territories acquired by the United
States, to the organization of tribunals, and to the establishment of criminal jurisdiction have usually been regarded as non self-executing.' 8
14. See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933); Jones v. Meehan,
175 U.S. 1 (1899) ; Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884).

15. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
16. See Evans, Some Aspects of the Problem of Self-Executing Treaties, Proceedings, AM. Soc. INT'L, L., 66, 74 (1951).
17. See Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 738 (1943) (concurring
opinion).
18. Wright, The Legal Nature of Treaties, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 719 (1916).
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Ii.
CASES INVOLVING THE UNITED

NATIONS CHARTER.

A.
Cases Dealing With the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
The provisions of the United Nations Charter dealing with the legal
capacity of the United Nations Organization and its privileges and immunities 9 have been held to be self-executing in the case of Curran v. City of
New York. 20 In that case the court held that pursuant to the treaty the
United Nations could hold land in New York and was immune from
suit. Also, in the case of Balfour, Guthrie and Co. v. United States2' the
United Nations was held to have legal capacity to sue the United States
by virtue of the provisions of article 104 of its Charter for damages to
United Nations cargo carried in a United States owned ship.
B.
Cases Dealing With the Human Rights Provisions.
Authorities have differed as to whether the Charter's provisions on
human rights22 have been incorporated into the municipal law of the United
States so as to supersede inconsistent state legislation, and clearly these
are the most controversial sections. The solution, of course, depends upon
whether these provisions are self-executing. Professor Sayre makes a
strong argument that they are. The tenor of his reasoning is found in
this sentence where he says: "I submit, the United Nations Charter as
law does prevail within United Nations territory." 23 And further in the
same article he says :24
"But the United Nations Charter is now not only part
Constitution but by our constitutional act we are part of the
Nations. In so far as the Charter's provisions justly apply,
not free to choose in a hit or miss way, we are morally and
bound to give them all full effect all the time."

of our
United
we are
legally

Several equally convincing arguments to the contrary have also been advanced. 25 In the cases of Shelley v. Kraemer,20 Sipes v. McGhee,2 7 and
19. U. N. CHARTER art. 104.

20. 191 Misc. 229, 77 N.Y.S.2d 206 (Sup. Ct. 1947), off'd, 275 App. Div. 784,
88 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1949).
21. 90 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1950).
22. U. N. CHARTER arts. 55(c), and 56.
23. See Sayre, Shelley v. Kraemer and United Nations Law, 34 IowA L. Rv.
1, 5 (1948-49); see also Sayre, United Nation Laws, 25 CAN. B. REv. 809 (1947).
24. Sayre, Shelley v. Kraemer and United Nations Law, 34 IOWA L. REv. 1, 8
(1948-49).
25. See, e.g., Holman, Treaty Law Making: A Blank Check for Writing A New
Constitution, 36 A.B.A.J. 707 (1950); Holman, An "International Bill of Rights";
Proposals Have Dangerous Implications for the United States, 34 A.B.A.J. 984
(1948) ; Rix, supra note 8.
26. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
27. 316 Mich. 614, 25 N.W.2d 638 (1947).
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Kempt v. Kempt, 2s counsel sought to show that restrictive land covenants
based upon race or color violated the human rights provisions of the United
Nations Charter. In each case, however, the court either refused to pass
upon the question or expressly rejected the contention that such restrictive covenant clauses could be successfully attacked in a court of law by
virtue of the legal effect of the United Nations Charter on United States
municipal law.
The confusion that lies in this area is obvious upon examination of
the California Alien Land Law cases. The decision of the California District
Court of Appeals in the Fujii case 29 was foreshadowed by the concurring
Justices in Oyama v. California3" when they cited the United Nations
Charter as substantiating their position that the California Alien Land
Law was void in its entirety. In the Fujii case, a Japanese alien had purchased land in California and brought an action against the state to determine whether escheat had occurred as provided by the Alien Land
Law. 31 The lower court determined that an escheat had occurred but on
appeal the district court of appeals reversed holding that the Alien Land
Law violated the spirit and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
However, on appeal by the state, the Supreme Court of California held
that the Alien Land Law was invalid as violative of the fourteenth amendment. In a lengthy discussion the court reviewed the distinction between
self-executing and non self-executing treaties and decided that the human
rights provisions of the United Nations Charter were not self-executing
and therefore could not invalidate a state law. It is submitted that the
provisions on human rights are no more vague than the provisions for
the United Nations Organization's privileges and immunities which have
been held to be self-executing. 32 Article 55(c) provides that the United
Nations shall promote "Universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction to race, sex,
language or religion." Article 56 provides: "All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." Article
104 provides: "The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of
its members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes."
It is further submitted that the United Nations Charter had a very
definite effect upon the outcome of the Fujii case. The constitutionality of
28. 188 Misc. 310, 69 N.Y.S.2d 680 (Sup. Ct. 1947).

29. See note 3, supra, and accompanying text.
30. 332 U.S. 633, 647-74 (1948) (concurring opinions). Section 9 of the act
provided for a presumption of an attempt to evade the escheat provisions when proof
was offered that an ineligible alien had received consideration for a conveyance of
realty and that title was taken in a citizen's or eligible alien's name. The majority
of the Supreme Court held that the section was invalid because it discriminated
against citizens who were children of ineligible aliens and thus was a denial of
equal protection.
31. Cal. Stats. 1921, p. 93.
32. See text accompanying notes 19-21 supra.
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this statute had been authoritatively established in a long line of decisions
of the United States Supreme Court.33 The Charter was at least effective
in so far as it evidenced a policy of the United States which caused the
California court to reframe its ideas of the equal protection clause of the
4
fourteenth amendment of the Constitution.3
In discussing the United Nations Charter's provisions dealing with
human rights as non self-executing, commentators upon the Fujii case
have emphasized the general scope of the language of these provisions,
urging that the only obligation created thereby is to cooperate in promoting certain ends, which must await congressional implementation.3 5 A
strong argument may be made for this view on the basis of the testimony
of the United States representatives who assisted in drafting the treaty.
They testified that they believed these provisions of the Charter constituted
only recommendations to the signing nations.36 The very terms of the
treaty would seem to indicate that the human rights provisions are not
self-executing. The whole tenor of these articles is one of future action,
rather than a present binding agreement. The treaty does not demand a
specific course of action to be taken by the parties thereto, other than
to cooperate with the United Nations. in promoting these ideals. However,
with reference to the same authorities, Professor Sayre reached an opposite conclusion3 7 and urged that the provisions of the United Nations
Charter on human rights had been incorporated into the municipal law
of the United States. He called for a court to apply the charter in litigation between private parties, 38 in effect predicting the decision of the California District Court of Appeals in the Fujii case. Under the solution
proposed by this Comment this argument would be eliminated since all
treaties would be non self-executing upon the municipal law of the United
States until implemented by Congress.
III.
ATTEMPTED SOLUTIONS.

As it was pointed out previously, the United States is the only
common-law country where it is possible for a treaty to become part of
33. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Porterfield v. Webb, 263
U.S. 225 (1923) ; Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923); Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S.
313 (1923).
34. For a discussion by a foreign court of the human rights provisions, see the
case of Re Drummond Wren, Ont. 778 (1945), where a Canadian court applied the
United Nations Charter and some analogous Canadian statutes to declare a private
covenant which discriminated against Jews invalid. While the human rights provisions of the Charter were used only by analogy to reach the decision, they were
considered to have some application by the court.
35. See Hudson, Charter Provisions on Human Rights in American Law, 44

AM. J.

INT'L

L., 543, 545 (1950).

36. Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the Charter
of the United Nations, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1945).

37. See SAYRE, supra note 24.
38. SAYRE, supra note 24, at 4.
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the municipal law without an implementing act of the legislative body.
Several proposals have been advanced for placing the United States on a
par with the other members of the United Nations who require an implementing act. The most famous of these is the "Bricker Amendment" 39
which called for sweeping controls on the power of the Executive to contract treaties. In effect it substituted congressional judgment for that of
the Executive. This seems to violate the traditional concept of separation
of powers. By attempting to do too much it has apparently failed to achieve
anything.
The American Bar Association Committee on Peace and Law
Through the United Nations has offered the following more moderate
proposal for consideration but it has received little support :4o
"A provision of a treaty which conflicts with any provision of
this Constitution shall not be of any force or effect. A treaty shall
become effective as internal law in the United States only through
legislation by Congress which it could enact under its delegated powers
in the absence of such treaty."
The first sentence merely states the obvious as far as it applies to express
provisions of the Constitution. The first part of the second sentence is
the important and vitally necessary provision, while the last part attempts
to overrule the decision of Missouri v. Holland.4 1 The wisdom of overruling that case is open to question, as it would appear that the necessary
conduct of foreign affairs would preclude such a limitation.

IV.
CONCLUSION.

It is submitted that the confusion which exists as to the effect of the
United Nations Charter upon inconsistent state laws illustrates the urgent
need for an amendment to the Constitution. The amendment should at
least limit the operation of a treaty upon the municipal law of the United
States until Congress has passed implementing legislation pursuant to the
treaty. In considering the problem it is important to note that a treaty
can become immediately effective and, without any additional act, be an
effective part of the municipal law of the United States under the current
constitutional provisions. We must also consider the questionable basis
42
for distinction between self-executing and non self-executing treaties.
The courts could justifiably sweep the distinction aside, and under the
39. S. J. Res. 130, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
40. Report of the Standing Committee on Peace and Law Through the United
Nations 4 (1952).
41. See note 7, supra, and accompanying text.
42. See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
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plain wording of the Constitution hold that all treaties are self-executing
thus removing what many consider a safeguard to local government.
Of course, any solution in this area should seek to preserve the traditional balance of power between the branches of the federal government
in arriving at a satisfactory compromise of this problem. To require
implementation by separate congressional act would leave the executive
branch free to pursue international objectives by treaty but still require
internal matters to be governed strictly by internal law.
In the absence of a constitutional amendment the courts are not
powerless to prevent the wholesale upsetting of the balance of power
between the state and federal government. The courts could establish a
presumption that all treaties afe non self-executing in the absence of explicit congressional legislation on the point.
It is unrealistic to assert that the ratification of the United Nations
Charter has had no effect on the internal law of the United States even
if the distinction between self-executing and non self-executing is maintained and the Charter held to be non self-executing in part. The mere
fact that it was ratified evidences a policy of the United States which
is as relevant as any other policy consideration in reaching a decision.
Several cases noted herein 43 have alluded to the United Nations Charter
as a policy basis for decision. However, it is submitted that it is vitally
important that a constitutional amendment confine the effect of a treaty
to only policy grounds until such time as Congress takes action to make
the treaty provisions part of the municipal law of the United States.
Edward J. Carney, Jr.

INFANTS-CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THE JUVENILE COURTTHE NEED FOR NATIONAL UNITY

AND

FEDERAL

INTERVENTION.

In the nineteenth century, responsibility for the care and education
of children was a private obligation. The major part lay with the parent,
but substantial portions were delegated to educators, to the clergy, to
employers, and to philanthropic organizations. In addition, private society
expected every individual to concern himself with the welfare of children.
It was not until the moral constraints thus imposed by society began to
fail in their purpose that the state would assume the obligation to provide
for those children who had been neglected.
43. See text accompanying notes 29-34 supra.
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It is common knowledge that these traditional moral forces have
evolved into a public responsibility in twentieth century America, and that,
as a consequence, a heavy burden has been cast on the state in respect
to the care and control of children. Departments of child welfare, as they
exist today, are wholly a modern phenomenon, the like of which was
unknown to our forefathers. The raison d'etre which supports these
public welfare departments is again a modern philosophy, the basic tenets
of which require the state to take an active and creative role in human
affairs, rather than merely to establish norms of conduct for disciplinary
purposes. This philosophical transition from the disciplinarian state to
the welfare state has been fully accomplished in the treatment of juveniles,
and its justification for historical and legal purposes has been a distortion
of the doctrine of parens patriae to fit modern concepts.'
The legal expression of the welfare philosophy is the Juvenile Court
Act,2 which has been adopted in one form or another throughout the
United States.8 Despite the fact that juvenile courts have been in existence
in the United States for sixty years, 4 widespread ignorance of their purpose and function yet subsists among members of the bar and the general public.5 However, contemporary recognition of juvenile delinquency
as a major social challenge will soon bring the juvenile court into the
public forum for reappraisal. In anticipation of this event, lawyers must
be prepared to defend whatever improvements prior legislation has wrought,
and must likewise be ready to suggest constructive modifications for confronting the social evil of juvenile delinquency which sixty years of the
Juvenile Court Act as variously adopted have utterly failed to rectify.
This Comment suggests the establishment by the federal government
of minimum constitutional standards for the treatment of juveniles, and the
concomitant reintroduction of the traditional disciplinary approach in modified form.
I.
PROBLEMS

IN JUVENILE COURT THEORY.

It would seem that states have overlooked or deliberately denied
minors their constitutional rights in the administration of the Juvenile
1. See Note, 29 IND. L.J. 475 (1954).
2. "Whereas, the welfare of the Commonwealth demands that children should
be guarded from association and contact with crime and criminals, ...
"Whereas, experience has shown that . . . the real interests of such children
require that . . . they be subjected to wise care, guidance, and control so that evil
tendencies may be checked and better instincts be strengthened ...
"Whereas, to these ends, it is important that the power of courts with respect
to the care, guidance, and control over delinquent, neglected, and dependent children
should be clearly distinguished from those exercised in the ordinary administration
of the criminal law; therefore. . .

1933, act 311, § 1.
3. See THg NATIONAL
DELINQUENCY,

."

Preamble to the Juvenile Court Act, Pa. Laws

CONFERENCE ON PREVENTION AND CONTROL OP JUVENILE

Recommendations for Action 26 (1947).

4. The first act was passed in Illinois in 1899. See Ill. Laws 1899, p. 131.
5. See 43 A.B.A.J. 703 (1957).
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Court Act. The reasons given for this are legion, but chief among them
is the purpose of the act, which is to rehabilitate and to reform, not to
discipline or punish.6 This purpose, of course, conforms with the social
philosophy which inspired the act, but it need not logically comport with
suspension of constitutional rights. Notwithstanding any logical non
sequitur, it is settled that infants being tried under the Juvenile Court
Act have no constitutional rights because they are not being subjected
to punishment.
Howsoever this may be, the underlying jurisprudential question is
indeed even more provocative than the constitutional issue and quite as
controversial. The question is whether the law, as law, can cope with
the added responsibilities which have been thrust upon it, or whether, in
order to perform simultaneously the duties of parent, confessor, big
brother, and disciplinarian, the law has had to compromise its historical
function so that as a result it performs none of these duties competently.
Historically, the transcendent importance of law is derived from its ability
to maintain order within the human complex. Order is achieved through
the true administration of justice. Justice, then, is the function of the
law, not reformation, nor rehabilitation, although neither of these is unrelated to justice. Nonetheless, justice cannot be sacrificed in an effort
to rehabilitate or to reform. Law must not win the battle for rehabilitation so energetically that it loses the war against injustice. The issue then
is whether the law should admit its limitations and return to its original
role of disciplinarian, or whether law should carry on under a modified
version of the Juvenile Court Act in which paramount regard would be
given to discipline and subordinate attention paid to reformation. Either
alternative would require the restoration of constitutional safeguards, because as pointed out above, a return to discipline would destroy the nonpunitive character of juvenile court proceedings which has been the
accepted justification for the suspension of those safeguards.
None of these observations can be properly assimilated without a
comprehensive understanding of the juvenile courts as they now operate.
It must be remembered in the analysis which follows that the juvenile
court is a tribunal with power to confine, in institutions neither like nor
unlike prisons, 7 the minors who appear before it; and that this power to
confine is the link between the traditional and the modern system. Confinement is essential to planned rehabilitation and reformation.8 Confine6. Rubin, Protecting the Child in Juvenile Court, 43 J. CIi.

425 (1952).
7. Compare Hall, A Visit to Detention Centres, 1954

CRIM.

L., C. & P. S.

L. Rev. 755.

8. "The whole and only object of such laws is to provide the child with an

environment such as will save him to the state and society as a useful and law-

abiding citizen, and to give him the educational requirements necessary to attain

that goal. To effect this purpose some restraint is essential. Such or similar restraint is, however, necessary in any institution of learning, however humble. Every-

where, we are all met with restraint." Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah 473, 478, 88 Pac.
609, 613 (1907).
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ment is also per se punitive and thus at once theoretically inconsistent
with pure reformation, and theoretically consistent with discipline. The
power to confine is the root of the controversy about juvenile courts, because to many persons, confinement for any purpose cannot be justified
unless it be effected by due process of law with full constitutional protection afforded the accused.

II.
CHARACTER OF JUVENILE COURT PROCEEDINGS.

A.
Jurisdiction.
Juvenile courts are given jurisdiction as to persons eighteen years
of age9 or under: (1) who have committed acts which would be crimes
or misdemeanors under the criminal code of the state if they were committed by adults, or (2) who are dependent, or (3) who are neglected,
as those terms are defined in the act.' 0 Obviously, this is a combination
of both criminal and civil jurisdiction. When a child commits criminallike acts, it implies that he is delinquent. When a child is destitute or
physically abused, it implies that he is dependent or neglected. In any
one of these instances, or in any combination of them, the juvenile court
has jurisdiction. As a practical matter, about eighty-three per cent of
juvenile court cases concern delinquency alone."
The question whether the jurisdiction thus conferred is exclusive
has been variously decided. For capital crimes, particularly homicide, some
states provide for the jurisdiction of the regular criminal courts, 12 but
the more consistent authority characterizes the jurisdiction as exclusive
notwithstanding.13 The alternative position is to leave the matter to the
court's discretion, thus creating a concurrent jurisdiction. This treatment
is recommended when the offender is between sixteen and eighteen years
14
of age at the time of the offense.
9. Marriage of the juvenile does not oust the jurisdiction of the court. State
v. Cronin, 220 La. 233, 56 So.2d 242 (1951). Contra State v. DeMarco, 20 Ala.
App. 52, 100 So. 574 (1924).
10. Typical definitions can be found in the Pennsylvania act, see PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11, § 244 (Purdon Supp. 1959).
11. See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U. S. DEI"T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE,

Statistical Series No. 47, Juvenile Court Statistics for the Year Ending 1956, p. 2,
Table A and p. 8 (1958). There were 520,000 delinquency cases throughout the
nation in 1956. There were 105,000 cases dealing with neglect and dependency. Dependency and neglect jurisdiction will eventually be removed from the Juvenile Court.
See NATIONAL PROBATION AND PAROLE ASS'N, STANDARD FAMILY COURT AcT (April
1959) ; the latter publication contains favorable commentary by Dean Roscoe Pound.
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 246(2) (Purdon Supp. 1959) ; cf. Johnson v. State,
43 Ga. App. 474, 159 S.E. 295 (1931) ; State ex rel. Corella v. Pence, 303 Mo.
598, 262 S.W. 360 (1924).
13. See State v. Monahan, 15 N.J. 34, 104 A.2d 21 (1954). See Juvenile Delinquency, 261 ANNALS 128 (1949).

14. See, Rubin, Protecting the Child in Juvenile Court, 43 J. CRIM. L., C. &

P. S. 425, 432 (1955).

See also NATIONAL PROBATION AND PAROLE ASS'N, STANDARD

JUVENILE COURT ACT (1949).
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Jurisdiction over neglected and dependent children is different in kind
from that exercised over delinquent children, in that it is not founded
upon any conduct or habit of the child, but rather upon his inability to
take care of his physical and psychological needs. 15 An abandoned child,
a child who lacks proper care for his mental or physical well-being, these
are the persons contemplated. 16
Finally, the juvenile court is given jurisdiction over adults who contribute to or cause the delinquency, dependency, or neglect of any child. 17
This jurisdiction is ancillary to the purpose of the Juvenile Court Act to reform the child - but is logically necessary as a correlative duty. However, this can be an illusory duty insofar as offenses indictable under a
criminal code are concerned because the adult can demand a trial by jury
and the juvenile court must then transfer the case to the regular criminal
courts."8 Thus, it seems as if confinement cannot be imposed upon an
adult without due process of law.
The more difficult problem is when does the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court terminate. The general rule is that the juvenile court continues to have jurisdiction until the child reaches majority.' 9 But at least
one case has held that a person twenty-five years of age can be remanded
to the juvenile court for a new trial when it appears that that tribunal
20
had exclusive jurisdiction over his criminal conduct when committed.
Juvenile court legislation provides for the amendment of orders upon
petition or motion, the grounds for amendment not usually being definitively
2
stated, but an amendment is warranted upon changed circumstances. '
Such a motion or petition is timely up to the time the child attains the
age of twenty-one years.
15. In re DuMond, 196 Misc. 16, 92 N.Y.S.2d 805 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
16. Petition of Wingard, 7 Pa. D. & C.2d 522 (County Ct. Som. 1956). The
Standard Juvenile Court Act, an influential publication of the National Probation
and Parole Ass'n, opposed dependency jurisdiction for the juvenile court in its 1949
revision, on the grounds that, when there is no neglect, mere poverty does not support the authoritative intervention of a court, but suggests the assistance of a welfare agency. Compare the provisions of the Illinois Public Assistance Code, ILL.
STAT. ANN. c. 23, § 441-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1959).
17. See, e.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. c. 23, §§ 191, 196(a), (b) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1959).
18. "As we have already pointed out, other provisions of law . . . stand squarely
in the way of proceeding against adults for indictable offenses in the manner children
are proceeded against, and of putting the burden on them of demanding a jury trial.
As we deem the incompatibilities so fundamental, we are of the opinion the legislature never intended the juvenile court to have any jurisdiction over indictable
offenses except that when one is noticed in the course of the exercise of its appropriate functions, the case shall be returned by the judge of the court to the proper
court for trial." Commonwealth v. Lash, 151 Pa. Super. 601, 30 A.2d 609 (1943).
19. See Ex parte Naccarat, 328 Mo. 722, 41 S.W.2d 176 (1931) ; In re Redding,
184 Pa. Super. 352, 134 A.2d 689 (1957); Jacob v. Public Welfare Commission,
7 Utah 2d 304, 323 P.2d 720 (1958).
20. Johnson v. State, 18 N.J. 422, 114 A.2d 1 (1955) (criticized in Note, 10
RUTGERS L. REv. 448 (1955)).
21. In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973
(1955).
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B.
Institution of Proceedings.
Proceedings are instituted by petition, not by grand jury indictment
nor by information, and standing to file a petition is liberally given.22
The court then proceeds to summon the child and his parent or guardian.
24
23
Failure to appear subjects the child to contempt proceedings, or arrest.
25
No plea or answer is expected from the child.
It is generally provided that the court is in control of the child pending investigation and disposition of the petition, and that the court may
temporarily commit the child to a suitable detention center. 26 No right
to bail exists,27 but the temporary confinement has been held subject to
28
review by writ of habeas corpus.
A marked diversity of opinion has occurred over the issue of the
parents' right to notice. The case of Ex parte Sharp29 held that because
a parent could question a child's confinement by writ of habeas corpus,
the requirements of due process were satisfied and no notice was necessary
prior to the commitment proceedings. By contrast, the case of State
ex rel. Clark v. Allaman30 proceeded on the theory that a juvenile court
is without jurisdiction over the child, and its findings and adjudications
31
are therefore void if the parent is not named and summoned as a party.
The latter type reasoning is adopted in domestic relations actions for
child custody, 32 and appears to be the better view whenever a change in
custody is sought.

33

22. N. Y. CHILDREN'S CT. AcT § 10 (1958) says, "... any interested person
having knowledge or information"; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 246 (Purdon Supp.
1959) says, ". . . any citizen, resident of the county. .. ."
23. See N. Y. CHILDREN'S CT. AcT §§ 12, 13 (1958). Contra, In re Trignani,
148 Pa. Super. 142, 24 A.2d 743 (1942) (holding that contempt power was beyond
the authority of a juvenile court).
24. N. Y. CHILDREN'S CT. AcT § 20 (1958) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 248
(Purdon Supp. 1959).
25. Freestone v. State ex rel. Advance Rumley Co., 98 Ind. App. 523, 176 N.E.
877 (1931).
26. See
FARE,

CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.
S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELSTANDARDS FOR SPECIALIZED COURTS DEALING WITH CHILDREN 45 (1954).

27. Espinosa v. Price, 144 Tex. 121, 188 S.W.2d 576 (1945) ; see also Ex parte

Walker, 28 Tex. App. 246, 13 S.W. 861 (1889).
28. Application of Jacobsen, 278 App. Div. 945, 104 N.Y.S.2d 949 (2d Dep't 1951).
29. 15 Idaho 120, 96 Pac. 563 (1908).
30. 154 Ohio St. 296, 95 N.E.2d 753 (1950). See also In re Frinzl, 152 Ohio
St. 164, 87 N.E.2d 583 (1949) which gives alternative relief by way of writ of
habeas corpus.

31. See Ex parte Baeza, 85 Okla. Crim. 76, 185 P.2d 242 (1947)

(implying that

the presence of one parent suffices).

32. See State ex rel. Davis v. Achor, 225 Ind. 319, 75 N.E.2d 154 (1947);
State ex rel Graves v. District Court, 61 Nev. 269, 125 P.2d 723 (1942).
33. See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U. S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,

STANDARDS

FOR SPECIALIZED COURTS DEALING WITH

CHILDREN
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C.
Juvenile Court Procedures.
34
Juvenile courts do not have trial by jury in the majority of states.

Some states, such as Illinois and New York, provide for trial by jury
of six. 35

The reasoning which sustains the denial of a jury trial is again

the non-punitive purpose of the proceedings. Any confinement which results is supposedly for the good of the child, and the state as parens
patriae has the power to deprive infants of their liberty through summary
procedures.
Insofar as the rules of evidence are concerned, it is virtually impossible to draw a general conclusion. There is authority for the proposition that a juvenile court proceeding is invalid if unsworn testimony is
admitted. 36 As for the privilege against self-incrimination, orders of a
3 7
juvenile court have been reversed because such evidence was admitted,
and they have been upheld in the face of such evidence.3 8 Hearsay in some
cases has been freely admitted, 39 while in others its admission has been
denounced.4 0 The burden of proof has been aligned with civil jurisdiction
and has been characterized as a preponderance of the evidence, 41 but there
is persuasive authority that juvenile court decisions should be supported
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 42 The right of cross-examination has
been for the most part retained, and the inadmissibility of privileged
43
communications has been acknowledged at least once.
A significant problem in deciding the relevance of evidence is determining the ingredients which comprise delinquency. The meaning is
not free from difficulty. It seems as if conduct which is the equivalent
of a criminal act is prima facie evidence of delinquency, 44 but non-criminal
34. See Ex parte Echols, 245 Ala. 353, 17 So.2d 449 (1944); Martin v. State,
213 Ark. 507, 211 S.W.2d 116 (1948); Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 A. 678
(1923) ; State v. Campbell, 325 Mo. 561, 32 S.W.2d 69 (1930) ; In re Santillanes, 47
N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943) ; State ex rel. Pillars v. Harwood, 184 Tenn. 515,
201 S.W.2d 672 (1947); Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269 (1944);
In re Gomez, 113 Vt. 224, 32 A.2d 138 (1943). Contra, Newman v. Wright, 126
W. Va. 502, 29 S.E.2d 155 (1944).
35. See ILL. STAT. ANN. C. 23, § 191 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1959); N. Y. CHILDR.N'S CT. ACT, § 14 (1958).
36. In re Mantell, 157 Neb. 900, 62 N.W.2d 308 (1954).
37. State ex rel. Palagi v. Hutton, 81 Mont. 144, 262 Pac. 172 (1927) ; Williams
v. State, 219 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
38. In re Dargo, 81 Cal. App.2d 205, 183 P.2d 282 (1947); State v. Cronin,
220 La. 233, 56 So. 2d 242 (1951).
39. See, e.g., In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954) ; Christensen v.
Christensen, 119 Utah 361, 227 P.2d 760 (1951) ; In re Bentley, 246 Wis. 69, 16
N.W.2d 390 (1944).
40. See, e.g., In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App.2d 787, 241 P.2d 631 (1952) ; In re
Montell, 157 Neb. 900, 62 N.W.2d 308 (1954); In re Smith, 326 P.2d 835 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1958).
41. See, e.g., State v. Thomasson, 154 Tex. 151, 275 S.W.2d 463 (1955). Compare United States v. Borders, 154 F.Supp. 214 (D.C. Ala. 1957).
42. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444 (1946).
43. In re Sippy, 97 A.2d 455 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1953).
44. See Commonwealth v. Carnes, 82 Pa. Super. 335 (1923).
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conduct can also constitute delinquency if it is repetitious and habitual and
tends to degrade or demoralize the child. 45 The character of the child's
associates is relevant in connection with this latter type conduct.
46
The admitted evidence must prove that the child is delinquent,
47
It
and further that the parents are unfit to retain custody of the child.
should be noted that the ultimate issue is not guilt nor innocence related
to the commission of an anti-social act; rather, the ultimate issue is the
status of the child, that is to say, what he is, or is becoming. That status
is determined by evidence of many acts in the same generic class which
have been committed over a period of time.
In conjunction with evidentiary problems, it is not amiss to draw the
reader's attention to certain sociological and psychological tests which
have been devised to indicate the symptoms of delinquency. Outstanding
among these tests is the Glueck Social Prediction Scale. 48 The test is
designed to discover proneness to delinquency as early as the age of six.
The tables are described as ninety per cent accurate. Briefly, the thought
behind this test is a measurement of the influence of parental affection
and discipline and family cohesiveness on delinquent children. The Glueck
test is prognostic and is a device of preventive methodology. Thus its
admissibility into juvenile court proceedings is highly undesirable, since
evidence of present delinquent conduct coupled with evidence of prior
prediction of that conduct is prejudical in the extreme. However, the
equally objectionable results of Rorschach tests (ink blot psychoanalysis) '
and psychiatric interviews are accepted without question in juvenile court
at the present time, 49 and it is not inconsistent with the current parens
patriae philosophy to predict that prognostic test results will likewise become acceptable.
D.
Appeal and Review.
Passing from problems of proof and trial procedure, it is next pertinent
to investigate the scope of judicial review of juvenile court findings and
orders. It has been noted that interlocutory orders for temporary confinement have been reviewed by writ of habeas corpus.50 In most states
45. Compare State v. Smith, 75 N.D. 29, 25 N.W.2d 270 (1946), with State v.
Rutledge, 321 Mo. 1090, 13 S.W.2d 1061 (1929) and Berry v. Superior Court, 139

Wash. 1, 245 Pac. 409 (1926).
46. People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353, cert. denied, 289 U.S. 709"
(1933).
47. State ex rel. Stearns County v. Klasen, 123 Minn. 382, 143 N.W. 984

(1913); State v. Smith, 75 N.D. 29, 25 N.W.2d 270 (1946).

48. A summary analysis of this test is contained in Thompson, A Validation of
the Glueck Social Predictions Scale for Proneness to Delinquency, 43 J. CRIM. L.,

C. & P.S. 451 (1952).

Fuller treatment is available in S. & E.T.

RAVELING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

GLUgcK, UN-

(1950).

49. See A Symposium on: Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency, 64 HARV. L. Rnv.

1022 (1951).
50. See supra note 29.
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Juvenile Court Acts themselves make limited provisions for an appeal,
conditions precedent usually being a rehearing before the juvenile court
judge and a compilation of the transcript of record." But it has been
held, in the absence of such statutory provisions, that there is no constitutional right to an appeal. 52 Later cases have dwelt on the problem
more at length and the trend seems to favor review of juvenile court
5
orders, especially if commitment is involved. 3
There is a constantly increasing use of the extraordinary writ of
habeas corpus in this field of judicial review. Preliminary orders for
detention can span a considerable period of time prior to hearing, and
orders for commitment take effect at once despite a denial of the right
to bail and despite the fact that the conditions precedent to appeal, rehearing and transcription can well consume a few months. The situation
can prove to be most onerous and unfair to children over sixteen years of
age since temporary confinements for this group can be in the regular
54

county jail.

The criminal convict can usually expect his confinement to be diminished by good behavior or by executive pardon. Such post-conviction
remedies are not available to the juvenile delinquent who has been committed to the state industrial reform school. For him, executive clemency
does not exist - again for the simple reason that clemency is a mitigation
of punishment and is unrelated to confinement for corrective purposes.55

III.
SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS

TO JUVENILE

COURT LEGISLATION.

Juvenile court legislation has withstood constitutional attacks based
on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment 56 and the in57
voluntary servitude prohibition of the thirteenth amendment.

Equal protection attacks have been far more frequent than any other.
The theory is, of course, that classifying juveniles as the only group to
which the iconoclastic criminal procedures of the Juvenile Court Act will
51. See, e.g., N. Y.

CHILDREN'S

CT.

AcT, §

43 (1958): PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,

§§ 257, 258 (Purdon Supp. 1959). See also Wooten v. Commonwealth, 255 Ky. 810,
75 S.W.2d 556 (1934).
52. Marlow v. Commonwealth, 142 Ky. 106, 133 S.W. 1137 (1911). Cf. Wissenberg v. Bradley, 209 Iowa 813, 229 N.W. 205 (1929); In re Santillanes, 47 N.M.
140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943).

53. See In re Mantell, 157 Neb. 900, 62 N.W.2d 308 (1954).
54. See Pxk. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 248 (Purdon Supp. 1959).
55. Bryant v. Brown, 151 Miss. 398, 118 So. 184 (1928).
56. See Taylor v. Means, 139 Ga. 578, 77 S.E. 373 (1913) ; Commonwealth v.
Pear, 183 Mass. 247, 66 N.E. 719 (1903), aff'd, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
57. See Kennedy v. Meara, 127 Ga. 68, 56 S.E. 243 (1906); Bryant v. Brown,
151 Miss. 398, 118 So. 184 (1927).
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apply is arbitrary and unreasonable.5 8 Analogies are drawn to criminal law
and to the age of criminal responsibility. The argument is made that at
common law not only were all persons over fourteen years of age considered equally responsible for criminal conduct, but also that even children below fourteen, but over seven years of age, were able to stand trial.
Factual results in the administration of juvenile court legislation
have likewise given rise to equal protection arguments. If a child of fourteen is committed under juvenile court procedure, there is no guarantee
against his being confined for the next seven years. Such a result, when
predicated upon a finding of delinquency which is derived from evidence
of habitual truancy, or consistent use of vile language, is so much harsher
than any corresponding result for an adult that discrimination is patent.
Nevertheless, juvenile court proceedings and the theory upon which
they are based have been sustained again and again in the face of every
constitutional objection.59 Therefore, it is settled law that they are fundamentally valid.

IV.
JUVENILES AND FEDERAL LAW.

Federal juvenile legislation is contained in the Federal Youth Corrections Act ° and the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act.6 ' The former
created an administrative division within the Board of Parole, the latter
is the Juvenile Court Act so modified as to conform with federal jurisdiction, and is administered by the United States District Courts. Also, the
delinquency act has the unique provision that the juvenile himself must
consent in writing to the proceedings. 62 In the interpretation of these acts,
the courts have given much latitude to the Attorney General's discretion;
they have allowed him to override the juvenile's consent to delinquency
proceedings and have confirmed his decisions to proceed under the cor63
rections act after regular conviction.
58. See, e.g., People v. Scherbing, 93 Cal. App. 2d 736, 209 P.2d 796, (1949)
State v. Meyer, 228 Minn. 286, 37 N.W.2d 3 (1949); Wheeler v. Shoemake, 213
Miss. 374, 57 So.2d 267 (1952) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Clawges v. Claudy, 173 Pa.
Super. 410, 98 A.2d 225 (1953).
59. See, e.g., Pugh v. Bowden, 54 Fla. 302, 45 So. 499 (1907); People ex rel.
Martin v. Mallary, 195 Ill. 582, 63 N.E. 508 (1902) ; In re Turner, 94 Kan. 115,
145 Pac. 871 (1915) ; Hunt v. Wayne Circuit Judges, 142 Mich. 93, 105 N.W. 531
(1905) ; State ex rel. Kelly v. Wolfer, 119 Minn. 368, 138 N.W. 315 (1912) ; State
ex rel. Cave v. Tincher, 258 Mo. 1, 166 S.W. 1028 (1914) ; Commonwealth v. Fisher,
213 Pa. 48, 62 AtI. 198 (1905); State v. Cagle, Ill S.C. 548, 96 S.E. 291 (1918);
Uram v. Roach, 47 Wyo. 335, 37 P.2d 793 (1934).
60. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-24 (1951).
61. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-37 (1951).
62. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5032-33 (1951).
63. See White v. Reid, 126 F. Supp. 867 (D. D.C. 1954).
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Neither of these enactments is comparable to state treatment of
juveniles. States do not permit the juvenile to choose between criminal
proceedings and juvenile court proceedings. With states, juvenile court
proceedings are mandatory in accordance with the jurisdiction of the
court. In the states, the theory behind the Federal Youth Corrections Act
is not favored.6 4 The corrections act separates the issues of criminal guilt
and punishment. It presupposes a determination of guilt in accordance
with established criminal procedures, but it provides for sentencing of
youthful offenders, not to the federal penitentiaries, but to institutions
65
specially adapted for rehabilitative treatment.
Under present federal law no juvenile can be denied his constitutional
rights without his consent in writing, and no confinement is possible without due process of law. After the determination of delinquency or guilt,
the punitive aspect of sentencing is de-emphasized, and the reformation
technique is stressed.

V.
FEDERAL

SUPREMACY AND

STATE

LAW:

Two

CASES.

The full range of state and federal policy toward juvenile offenders
has now been transited. The policies have been seen to be conflicting,
both in theory and in practice. One would think, then, that upon review
of state court decisions, the supremacy of federal law would occasion reversal of the state court judgments upholding the constitutionality of the
various juvenile court statutes. This is not to deny state sovereignty,
and such a meaning is not intended. There are two compelling reasons,
however, for denominating the juvenile delinquency problem a federal
issue. First, juvenile delinquency is a national subject because treatment
thus far has raised basic constitutional questions, and, under the fourteenth amendment, the federal government has final authority in such
matters. Second, juvenile delinquency is a subject national in scope and
in effect. Every state has recognized the special problems involved, yet
the product of their unconnected efforts to solve these problems has been
chaos, both for the juvenile and for the law enforcement authorities.
Therefore the need for national unity in organization is clearly manifested.
Moreover,

'n accordance

with the principles of Cooley v.

Board of

64. Although the Model Youth Corrections Act was drafted in 1940 by the
American Law Institute in response to the report of the Wickersham Commission,
its adoption has progressed at snail's pace. California was the first to enact it in
1941. Minnesota, Wisconsin, Massachusetts, Texas, Kentucky, Illinois, and Washington have followed. See Youngdahl, Give the Youth Corrections Program a Chance,
20 FED. PROB. 3 (March 1956).
65. See Reed, The Federal Youth Corrections Act in Operation, 18 FZD. PROD.
10 (Sept. 1954).
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Wardens,8 federal law by nature extends to national issues so long as
87
the federal government has power over the subject matter.
The federal government has not been unaware of its duties to combat
and control juvenile delinquency. Representatives from the states of California, Florida, Kentucky, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Pennsylvania have introduced in Congress bills to provide federal aid and to
initiate a federal juvenile delinquency program. 8 These bills confirm the
observations set out above. The findings and policies of H. R. 652,
Eighty-Fifth Congress, First Session, the Administration's bill, declare:

"(2) [J]uvenile delinquency is a steadily mounting problem of
nationwide proportions in both our urban and rural communities; the
problem overreaches local and even state boundaries in some of its
aspects; state and local resources, especially in regard to the availability of specialized facilities and professional personnel trained to
handle the problems of delinquency, are, in most cases, inadequate ......
The major purpose of these bills is to obtain money and information
which only the federal government is competent to provide. They do not
contemplate restoration of constitutional rights to minors in so many
terms; their emphasis is on conserving the nation's youth. But they all
provide for an advisory council in the federal government whose duty
it is to devise ways and means of lessening delinquency cases. Should
such a council decide that a reintroduction of punishment as a corrective
would be advisable, it would then become necessary to restore constitutional safeguards to delinquency proceedings in order to effectuate the
national policy.
The constitutional issue has been squarely presented to the United
States Supreme Court on at least two occasions; once in the case of
People v. Lewis,69 again in the case of In re Holmes.70 The chronology
of the Lewis case follows:
"The defendant was charged on March 2, 1931 with being a
juvenile delinquent in that he violated the provisions of sec. 486 of
66. 53 U.S. 299 (1851).

This case deals with the power to regulate interstate

commerce, but in its broader meaning it expounds a principle of federalism which
can be analogized to all powers given the federal government. In the present frame
of reference, the federal power would be applicable through the implementation of

the fourteenth amendment. Thus, in the words of Cooley: "Whatever subjects

of this power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or
plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive
regulation by Congress." Id. at 319.
67. On the principle of federalism, compare Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S.
299 (1851), with Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959), and Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52 (1941) (dissenting opinion).
68. See House of Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor, Hearings
Before Subcommittee on Special Education, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 1 (1957).
69. 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353, cert. denied, 289 U.S. 709 (1933).
70. 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955).
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the Penal Law of the State of New York by breaking and entering
a certain building in the City of Binghamton, N. Y., and that he was
at that time fifteen years of age. On March 3, 1931, the very next
day, he was brought before the judge of children's court, in his chambers, and in the presence of his mother, sister, and a minister of
the gospel, and the judge's stenographer, and was questioned by the
judge. No one else was in the room at the time of the hearing (if
such procedure might at any time be called a hearing) ; at the conclusion, the court asked: 'Anything want to be said on behalf of this
boy by anyone', to which there was no answer. And the judge immediately adjudged the boy to be a juvenile delinquent, and committed
him to the State Industrial and Agricultural School at Industry, N. Y.,
there to stay during the term of his minority, which, in this state,
would be twenty-one years of age, a period of approximately six
years." 71
The only issue in the Lewis case was whether the defendant had a
constitutional right to a hearing. It was beyond argument that Lewis
was not accorded a hearing. The New York Court of Appeals held that
there was no constitutional right to a hearing because the proceedings were
not criminal. 72 The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.
Fourteen years later, the Supreme Court decided that, in a criminal proceeding, a minor was entitled to full constitutional rights, including specifically a right to a hearing and a right to counsel.73
Then, in 1955, the Supreme Court was petitioned for certiorari in
the Holmes case. Holmes had been committed, as had Lewis, pursuant
to an order of a juvenile court. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had
held, as had the New York Court of Appeals earlier, that there were no
74
constitutional rights involved because the proceedings were not criminal.
The petition was phrased in these words :
"Clearly, before many children's lives are ruined as a result of
unfair or arbitrary decisions - made without the benefit of procedural
due process - this Court should establish that juveniles, as well
'7 5
as adults, are entitled to certain minimum constitutional protections.
The petition for certiorari was denied without opinion.
71. Brief sur Motion for Leave to File Amended Statement as to Jurisdiction
and Amended Statement, pp. 6-7, Lewis v. New York, 289 U.S. 709 (1933).
72. "Since the proceeding was not a criminal one, there was neither right to, nor
necessity for, the procedural safeguards prescribed by constitution and statute in criminal cases." People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 177, 183 N.E. 353, 355 (1932) (two
judges dissented).
73. De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947).
74. "But, since, as pointed out, juvenile courts are not criminal courts, the constitutional rights granted to persons accused of crimes are not applicable to children
brought before them ..
" In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 601, 109 A.2d 523, 525 (1954).
75. Brief sur Petition for Writ of Certiorari, pp. 9-10, In re Holmes, 348 U.S.
973 (1955).
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The irresistible conclusion from these cases is that children may be
committed to reformatories as a result of hearings which are not sustainable by any court if they are styled criminal; yet which are universally
sustainable if they are labelled juvenile delinquency adjudications. Insofar
as the offense is concerned, the sole substantive difference between these
proceedings is the bare nomencalture. Insofar as confinement is concerned,
there is no difference at all, since these reformatories house delinquents
and felons indiscriminately so long as they are minors.
Such conclusions are monstrous, but this is the law. And it is reasonably inferable that this law will not change.
Perhaps this result is inevitable. Courts know how to get facts and
render decisions; they do not seem to know how to treat exceptional
children.7 1 As a rule of thumb, it is perhaps better for the courts to
decline making law for juveniles because of the great harm which could
come from spasmodic interference with the reform movement. But whether
this policy should be used to avoid recognition of the palpable injustices
which occur is an unanswered question.
From these observations, combined federal action is indicated. Congress should prescribe that minors are entitled to constitutional protection
of their personal liberty; then the federal courts should put content into
77
such laws by review of state court commitments.

VI.
CONCLUSION.

The above suggestions for federal intervention in the field of juvenile
delinquency reveal a belief in the hopelessness of reforming the present
state-created legislative structure, which is inexorably constricted on both
its practical and theoretical sides and cannot, within tolerable time limitations, be regenerated from within.
The cardinal mistake of juvenile court legislation is its univocal outlook. It envisions but one set of facts. That set of facts implicitly
assumes: 1) that the accused has committed a delinquent act, 2) that
the accused is repentent, and 3) that the primary cause of the conduct
of the accused is either moral ignorance, or youthful recklessness, or resentment of authority which is not understood, or some combination of environmental and social pressures. The first assumption warrants disposing
with a trial and the need to prove bad conduct by competent evidence.
76. As a brief introduction to the problems involved in the treatment of exceptional children, see OFFicE OF EDUCATION, U. S. DEP'T op HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND
WELFARE, BULL. No. 11, TEACHERS OF CHILDREN WHO ARE SOCIALLY AND EMOTIONALLY MALADJUSTED (1957).
77. The use of habeas corpus for review in federal courts of state commitments
presents the problem of exhaustion of state remedies. See Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S.
672 (1948), declaring certiorari to the United States Supreme Court to be no longer
a part of state procedural review.
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The second assumption disposes of the need for punishment which is
properly directed at begetting repentence through fear. The third assumption presupposes incumbrances justifying and indicating the rehabilitative
treatment contemplated by the Juvenile Court Act. Such legislation is
ideal for this one set of facts. But the introduction of other facts reduces
this ideal to a shambles.
If one assumes the innocence of the accused, the act becomes thoroughly objectionable. If one assumes the moral viciousness of the accused,
the act becomes wholly inept. Moreover, if one assumes the position of
the victim of the juvenile violence, the act seems utterly without regard
for restitution in any frame of reference. The injured party cannot complain if no action is taken; nor can he compel state action initially. There
is slight possibility that a civil remedy would yield any reimbursement, yet
the means of coercing restitution by threat of criminal prosecution is
simply unavailable.
There is a better way. The Federal Youth Corrections Act provides
for treatment after conviction. Constitutional procedures are accorded the
accused at the trial. The issue of guilt is determined in accordance with
law, not human caprice. What is more, discipline can be reintroduced
where it is deemed advisable. Palliative welfare philosophies need no
longer obscure what is obviously punishment for criminal conduct. In
addition, it is quite likely that the restoration of constitutional rights
for the protection of the accused and the reintroduction of punishment
will not only enhance respect for the law and its enforcement authorities,
but will also augment the prestige of the sociologists in their efforts to
instill in our American youth a more discriminating appreciation for the
moral values in life.
John M. Regan

TORTS-LIBEL

AND

SLANDER-ABSOLUTE

ADMINISTRATIVE

PRIVILEGE BEFORE

AGENCIES.

The law of defamation is primarily concerned with the protection of
the individual's interest in his own reputation.' However, in the area of
privilege the benefit to the public of having the processes of government
function as freely as possible overrides this interest. The policy behind
the granting of a privilege is that the benefit to the public outweighs the
occasional harm to the individual's reputation through the malicious abuse
of the prerogatives of his office by an officer of the government.2 Absolute
privilege is extended to the statements of an official who is in a position of
1. RESTATtMENT, TORTS § 559 (1938).
2. See Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Reagan, 140 Tex. 105, 113, 166 S.W.2d 909,

913 (1942).
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such importance in the government that public interest demands that he
be free to communicate freely in exercising the functions of his office. This
removes the fear of civil actions against such officials for anything they3
may say or write in the course of proceedings in which they are involved.
Absolute privilege has been extended to judges, attorneys, parties, witnesses and jurors in judicial proceedings, 4 to members of the legislature, 5
and to certain high executive officers who are acting within the scope
of their duties. 6 Where the defamation is made by one in a less sensitive
position in the government, a conditional privilege is granted and he is
required to prove that the statement was made in good faith3
The administrative branch of the government has experienced such,
growth, and has been performing public functions in such a wide area, that
an inquiry is warranted in order to determine what privilege, if any, will
be extended to its proceedings. Some writers suggest that absolute privilege is necessary for all important administrative proceedings on the theory
that even the possibility of a civil suit will deter administrative officials
or persons communicating with them from the free interchange which
is the life blood of administrative proceedings. 8 Conversely, it could be
argued that because of the size of the administrative branch of the government, the granting of absolute privilege to all important administrative
proceedings would be such a great extension of the privilege that the
rights of individuals in their reputations would be unduly jeopardized.
This Comment will attempt to set forth the present law on the granting of a privilege to the statements made in the course of administrative
proceedings. The distinction is made by the courts between proceedings
which are quasi-judicial in nature and those which are not. The meaning
of quasi-judicial as used by the courts will be examined. Finally, nonjudicial administrative proceedings will be considered in the light of
whether any privilege will extend to them.

I.
QUASI-JUDICIAL

PROCEEDINGS.

In general, statements made during proceedings before an administrative agency which is exercising quasi-judicial functions will be absolutely privileged. 9 The reason most commonly advanced is that where the
3. PROSSER,

TORTS,

§ 95 (2d ed. 1941).

4. Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation Cases: Judicial Proceedings, 9
CoLum. L. Rev. 463, 474 (1909).
5. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
6. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896) (Postmaster-General); Ryan v.
Wilson, 231 Iowa 33, 300 N.W. 707 (1941) (Governor); Matson v. Margiotti,
371 Pa. 188, 88 A.2d 892 (1952) (Attorney-General).
7. PROSSER, TORTS, § 95 (2d ed. 1941).

8. See the introductory note to RESTATEMENT, TORTS, c. 25, topic 2, tit. B (1938).
9.

RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 585

(1956) ;

and comment; 1

PROSSER, TORTS § 95 (2d ed. 1941)

HARPER & JAMES, TORTS, §

5.23

;

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1959

23

FALL 1959]

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1959], Art. 5
COMMENTS

administrative agency has the procedural workings of a court, as it does
when it is exercising a quasi-judicial function, the danger of defamation
to the individual's reputation is greatly lessened. 10 The reasons for extending absolute privilege to such court proceedings were expressed by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in the following manner:"
"It is true that in strictly judicial proceedings the potential harm
which may result from the absolute privilege is somewhat mitigated
by the formal requirements such as notice and hearing, the comprehensive control exercised by the trial judge whose action is reviewable on appeal, and the availability of retarding influences such as
false swearing and perjury prosecutions; and the view has been expressed that it is only the potential harm as thus mitigated which may
properly be considered outweighed by the public interest in favor
of broad access by suitors to the court."
With regard to' the administrative process the court went on to say

:12

"But where as here the administrative proceeding was actually
conducted in a manner and with safeguards similar to a judicial proceeding and dealt with issues of significant public concern there
would, under this or any other plausible view, be no basis for refusing
to invoke the doctrine of absolute privilege or immunity to the same
extent that it would be applicable in court proceedings. Administrative agencies such as the Office of Milk Industry are now a vital
part of American life and perform important public duties; it seems
only just that, to the extent they discharge a function comparable to
the judicial function, they and the participants in the proceedings
before them be vested with a comparable privilege or immunity."
Thus, the more closely the procedure of any administrative agency approximates that of a court, the more readily will the courts be willing to extend
an absolute privilege to statements made during the course of its action.
New York courts have not followed the general rule and have held
that an absolute privilege extends only to the members of judicial or quasijudicial agencies, and that it does not extend to members of administrative
boards even in the course of hearings held before them.13 Under this
view, if an agency is vested by statute with the judicial attributes of a
court, then it is considered as judicial or quasi-judicial, but where the
functions of the agency are primarily administrative in nature, then abso10. Shummway v. Warrick, 108 Neb. 652, 189 N.W. 301 (1922); Rainier's
Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, 19 N.J. 552, 117 A.2d 889 (1955). See also Comment, 97 U. PA. L. Rzv. 877, 880 (1949).
11. Rainier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, 19 N.J. 552, 557, 117 A.2d 889,
894 (1955).
12. Id.

13. See Andrews v. Gardiner, 224 N.Y. 440, 121 N.E. 341 (1918); Lipton v.
Friedman, 2 Misc. 2d 165, 152 N.Y.S.2d 261 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
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lute privilege is not granted in any of its proceedings. 14 Thus, a zoning
board of appeals has been found to be an administrative body' 5 while a
Workman's Compensation Board has been held to be quasi-judicial in
16
nature.
Courts in general decide on the facts of each particular case as to
whether the administrative agency was exercising a quasi-judicial function when the defamation occurred. The test that is generally used is
whether the agency has, and was operating under, attributes similar to
that of a court. 17 Courts have construed this to mean a duty imposed by
law to hear complaints, to fix the time of hearing and to notify in writing
the persons whose rights are to be affected and finally, after hearing the
evidence adduced by the parties, to determine the rights of the parties
regarding the subject matter in question.' 8
Some of the more common types of agency proceedings that have
been found by courts to be quasi-judicial will be considered. The first
is that of licensing agencies. By their enabling statutes these agencies
are empowered to hold hearings in order to obtain enough facts to reach
a decision as to whether a license should be issued, suspended, or revoked. Defamatory statements made during the course of such hearings
are usually considered to be absolutely privileged.' 9 A fertile field for
litigation in this area has been that of licensing insurance agents. Because
of the need for information, the courts have held that communications
from insurance companies to the administrative agency concerning the
fitness of agents for a license are absolutely privileged. 20 However, where
the administrator revoked or suspended the insurance agent's license on
the request of an insurance company without holding a hearing on the
merits, it has been held that the agency was exercising a ministerial and
not a quasi-judicial function and the request of the insurance company
21
was not absolutely privileged.
Proceedings before Workman's Compensation Commissions in connection with an employee's claim have been held to be quasi-judicial in
14. Lipton v. Friedman, 2 Misc.2d 165, 152 N.Y.S.2d 261 (Sup. Ct. 1956);
Ellish v. Goldman, 117 N.Y.S.2d 867 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
15. Ellish v. Goldman, 117 N.Y.S.2d 867 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
16. Lipton v. Friedman, 2 Misc.2d 165, 152 N.Y.S.2d 261 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
17. White v. United Mills Co., 240 Mo. App. 443, 208 S.W.2d 803 (1948);
Shummway v. Warrick, 108 Neb. 652, 189 N.W. 301 (1922).
18. Fedderwitz v. Lamb, 195 Ga. 691, 25 S.E.2d 414 (1943); McAlister v.
Jenkins, 214 Ky. 802, 284 S.W. 88 (1926).
19. McAlister v. Jenkins, 214 Ky. 802, 284 S.W. 88 (1926); Shummway v.
Warrick, 108 Neb. 652, 189 N.W. 301 (1922); Alagna v. New York & Cuba Mail
S.S. Co., 155 Misc. 796, 279 N.Y. Supp. 319 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
20. Johnson v. Independent Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 94 F. Supp. 959 (E.D.S.C.
1951) ; Robertson v. Industrial Ins. Co., 75 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1954) ; Independent Life
Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 165 Tenn. 447, 55 S.W.2d 767 (1933); Reagan v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co., 140 Tex. 105, 166 S.W.2d 909 (1942).
21. Grubb v. Johnson, 205 Ore. 624, 289 P.2d 1067 (1955); Mortensen v. Life
Ins. Corp., 6 Utah 2d 408, 315 P.2d 283 (1957).
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nature and thus an absolute privilege has been extended to them. 22 Statements made by an employer to the state unemployment commission concerning the reason for dismissal of an employee have also been held to be
absolutely privileged. 23 Courts have been divided as to whether defamatory
statements made in an application for a pardon for a criminal offense are
absolutely privileged. 24 Many varied administrative agencies such as a
board of education, 25 a board of tax appeals,26 a board of election commissioners, 27 the Director of Milk Industry, 2s and a Rent Control Authority2 9
have been found to be exercising quasi-judicial functions when allegedly
defamatory statements were made. However, even though an agency may
have quasi-judicial powers, the absolute privilege may be denied where
30
it was not acting in such capacity when the defamation occurred.
Concerning the question of whether an agency is exercising quasijudicial functions, an examination of a statute such as the Administrative
Procedure Act may be helpful to ascertain whether the definition of "adjudicatory" function is encompassed within the term quasi-judicial as
used by the courts. It must be remembered that absolute privilege is a
part of the law of torts and not of administrative law and a statute setting
up various functions for administrative agencies may not be acceptable
to courts deciding the question of absolute privilege.
Section 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act concerns agency adjudication which is required to be determined on the basis of the record
after opportunity for an agency hearing.3' In general, this section provides that notice and hearing be granted by the agency to the interested
parties. In regard to notice, the parties involved must be informed as to
(1) the time, place and nature of the proceeding, (2) the legal authority
and jurisdiction under which the hearing is to be held and (3) the matters
of fact and of law asserted.3 2 Also, where private persons are the moving
parties, other parties to the proceedings must be given prompt notice
of the issues controverted in fact or in law. Under Section 5 (b), the
agency must afford all interested parties opportunity for the submission
and consideration of facts, arguments, offers of settlement or proposals
of adjustment. To the extent that the parties are unable to so determine
22. Bleecker v. Drury, 149 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1945); Simpson v. Oil Transfer
Corp., 75 F. Supp. 819 (N.D.N.Y. 1948); Lipton v. Friedman, 2 Misc. 2d 165, 152
N.Y.S.2d 261 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
23. White v. United Mills Co., 240 Mo. App. 443, 208 S.W.2d 803 (1948);
Wagner v. Bell, 70 Pa. D. & C. 411 (C.P. Lehigh 1949).
24. Andrews v. Gardiner, 224 N.Y. 440, 112 N.E. 341 (1918) (no privilege
granted). Contra, Connellee v. Blanton, 163 S.W. 404 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
25. White v. Holderby, 192 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1951).
26. Parker v. Kirkland, 298 Ill. App. 340, 18 N.E.2d 709 (1939).
27. Kimball v. Ryan, 283 Ill. App. 456 (1936).
28. Rainier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, 19 N.J. 552, 117 A. 2d 889 (1955).
29. Fenning v. S. G. Holding Co., 47 N.J. Super. 110, 135 A.2d 346 (1957).
30. Fedderwitz v. Lamb, 195 Ga. 691, 25 S.E.2d 414 (1943); Meyer v. Parr,
69 Ohio App. 344, 37 N.E.2d 637 (1941).
31. 60 STAT. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1952).
32. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDUR4 AcT, § 5(a), 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §
1004 (1952).
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any controversy by consent, the agency must afford an opportunity for a
hearing and decision upon notice which are to be in conformity with the
rules in Section 7 and 8 which deal with hearings and decisions.33 Section
10 grants judicial review to any person suffering a legal wrong or adversely
affected by the agency action except where judicial review is precluded by
statute or where the action of the agency is made discretionary. Every
agency action made reviewable by statute in addition to every final agency
action for which there is no adequate remedy in any court is made subject to judicial review.34 The federal courts have held that the right to
due notice of the claims of the opposing parties and an opportunity to be
heard in a fair and open hearing are assured to every litigant and are
essential to the validity of proceedings of an administrative tribunal. 35
But these courts have held that administrative hearings need not conform
precisely with the rules governing judicial proceedings.36 State courts
also have held that the technical procedure used by courts are not necessary in hearings before administrative tribunals provided they observe
elemental and fundamental principles of judicial inquiryA7 Therefore,
courts in deciding the question of absolute privilege say that it may be
extended to administrative proceedings which are conducted in a manner
and with safeguards similar to those found in judicial proceedings, namely
notice and hearing.38 Thus, there is a general agreement between administrative law and the law of privilege that notice and fair hearing
are required in the proceedings before administrative tribunals. But beyond
this general agreement the policies of these two branches of law differ
markedly.
The policy behind the rules of administrative law is to make the procedure of hearings as flexible as possible in order to facilitate the obtaining of information by the agency, subject to the basic requirements of a
fair hearing. 9 But in deciding cases involving absolute privilege the
policy of the courts has been to protect the rights of an individual in his
reputation by requiring that the procedure of the administrative tribunal
conform as closely as possible to the procedures used by courts them33.

ADMINISTRATMIV

PROCEDURE

ACT, § 10(b), 60 Stat. 239, 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C.

§ 1004 (1952).

34. ADMINISTRATIV PROCtDURt ACT, § 10(a) (b) and (c), 60 Stat. 243 (1946),
5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1952).
35. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 165, 166;
Green Spring Dairy v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 471 (4th Cir. 1953).
36. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940); Alesi v. Cornell,
250 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1957) ; Marzall v. Libby, McNiell & Libby, 188 F.2d 1013
(D.C. Cir. 1951). See also Mealha v. Shaughnessy, 219 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1955).
37. Bandeen v. Howard, 299 S.W.2d 249 (Ky. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 813
(1957) ; American Employers' Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 335 Mass. 748,
142 N.E.2d 341 (1957) ; Love v. State Bd. of Veterniary Examiners, 92 So. 2d 463
(Miss. 1956); Deitchman v. Kennedy, 5 Misc. 2d 680, 162 N.Y.S.2d 127 (Sup.
Ct. 1957). But see Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 314 Pa. 207,
171 Atl. 690 (1934) (administrative agencies should direct the procedure before them,
which should conform as nearly as possible to that of judicial proceedings).
38. See cases cited at note 10, supra.
39. See Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 253 (1944).
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selves. 40 However, where an administrative tribunal is conducting proceedings under Section 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act or a similar
statute, all of the essential requirements of the definition of "quasi-judicial"
as laid down by the courts are satisfied. Thus, there seems to be valid
grounds for granting absolute privilege for statements made during formal
agency adjudication which is conducted according to the rules as set
forth by Section 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Most administrative adjudications, however, are made, especially in
the first stage, by informal adjudication. 41 This means that the adjudication is conducted without the procedural safeguards embodied in Section
5 of the act but rather is conducted by conference, submissions or other
like methods. Without those procedural safeguards absolute privilege would
not be granted to informal agency proceedings under the present state
of the law because of judicial insistance upon procedure similar to that
of a court.
If the proceedings of the administrative tribunal are found to be quasijudicial, then witnesses receive an absolute privilege in their statements to
the same extent as in court proceedings. 42 This means that the testimony
must be relevant to the issues involved or the questions asked. 43 The
defamation must not occur in a matter not properly before the tribunal,
as for example where the defamation was contained in a letter which did
not require an exercise of the administrator's judicial function. 44 Lawyers
appearing before administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial func45
tions also have been granted an absolute privilege.
Some state statutes grant absolute privilege to statements made in
the proper discharge of official duty and in the course of any official proceeding authorized by law. 46 These statutes have extended the absolute
privilege to proceedings where otherwise there were insufficient procedural
safeguards. Statements made to a university board of regents sitting on
a faculty tenure hearing47 and to a state athletic commission investigating
bribery charges 48 have been held as privileged under such statutes. The
application of these statutes is limited, of course, by the requirement
that the statement be made in connection with an official function. Thus,
40. See cases cited at note 11, supra.

41. See DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, § 52 (1951).

42. White v. Holderby, 192 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1951); Parker v. Kirkland, 298
Ill. App. 340, 18 N.E.2d 709 (1939); Ellish v. Goldman, 117 N.Y.S.2d 867 (Sup.
Ct. 1952).
43. See 1 HARPER AND JAMEs, ToRTs, § 5.22 (1956).
44. Grubb v. Johnson, 205 Ore. 624, 289 P.2d 1067 (1955); Independent Life
Ins. Co. v. Hunter, 166 Tenn. 498, 63 S.W.2d 668 (1933). See also Colonial Stores
v. Barrett, 73 Ga. App. 839, 38 S.E.2d 306 (1946) (rules of the agency itself forbade
anything prejudicial concerning an employee to be placed in a report from the employer to the agency).
45. Bleecker v. Drury, 149 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1945).
46. See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 47; OKLA. STAT., tit. 12, § 1443 (1941).
47. Hughes v. Bizzel, 189 Okla. 472, 117 P.2d 763 (1941); Sanford v. Howard,
185 Okla. 660, 95 P.2d 644 (1939).
48. Kelley v. Daro, 47 Cal. App. 2d 418, 118 P.2d 37 (1941).
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where such a statute extends an absolute privilege to statements made in
"judicial proceedings and communications made preliminary thereto or
other official proceedings authorized by law," the statement of a bank's
vice-president to newspaper reporters commenting on the decision of the
National Labor Relations Board to reinstate an employee was not protected by absolute privilege. 49 Even though the bank was a party to the
dispute before the labor board, the court decided that such a malicious
statement was not part of the pending proceeding and not within the
coverage of the statute.
II.
NON-JUDICIAL

PROCEEDINGS.

If an administrative body is not exercising a quasi-judicial function,
then only a conditional privilege attaches to its proceedings.50 In some
cases the courts have discussed the fact that the administrative agency
was exercising an important governmental function as one of the reasons
for granting an absolute privilege to its proceedings but in these cases
the agency was also found to have been exercising a quasi-judicial
function. 51
Individual members of an administrative agency have been granted
absolute privilege in certain of their activities. In Pearson v. Wright,5 2
a statement made by the chairman of a federal commission in response to
an inquiry from a congressional subcommittee, with respect to matters
within the scope of the commission's activities, was held to be absolutely
privileged but the statement when made to the press by the same chairman was not. The court reasoned that the head of a governmental agency
or commission has a right, and in fact, a duty to respond to a request for
information made by a committee of Congress for their use. But the
court felt that the making of a press release was in no way related to
the duty imposed by law upon the defendant and hence was not absolutely privileged. In a similar case, 53 the Supreme Court of Michigan
granted an absolute privilege to statements contained in a letter by a
member of the State Liquor Control Commission written to the Civil
Service Commission expressing grave doubts about the plaintiff's ability
to fill an important post with the Liquor Control Commission. The reason
49. Washer v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 21 Cal. 2d 822, 136
P.2d 297 (1943). See also Hale Co. v. Lea, 191 Cal. 202, 215 Pac. 900 (1923)
(a letter of the director of a state laboratory to the Department of Agriculture
of a sister state charging the defendant with dealing in unfit food products was not
privileged because it was not in the proper discharge of an official duty).
50. See PROSSER, TORTS, § 95 (2d ed. 1941). Rule-making is an example of a
non-judicial function, and even though notice and opportunity for a hearing exist,
there is still only a conditional privilege.
51. Shummway v. Warrick, 108 Neb. 652, 189 N.W. 301 (1922); Rainier's
Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, 19 N.J. 552, 117 A.2d 889 (1955).
52. 156 F. Supp. 136 (D.D.C. 1957).
53. Schlinkert v. Henderson, 331 Mich. 284, 49 N.W.2d 180 (1951).
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advanced for the granting of the privilege was that the communication
was an official act of the Commissioner and within the scope of his duties.
Both of the above cases place great emphasis upon the fact that the
communication was within the scope of the duties imposed by law upon
the administrative officials. The grant of an absolute privilege to administrative officers in these two cases appears to be an extension of the same
privilege granted to highly placed executive officers for their statements
made within the scope of their official duties and which are pertinent
thereto. 54 However, in situations similar to these two cases, the absolute
privilege probably is restricted to the administrative officer himself and
would not be applied to statements made by other persons such as parties
or attorneys, who may be involved in the particular transaction involving
the administrative officer. If there is to be any extension of absolute
privilege to statements made in non-judicial administrative proceedings,
it will most likely be due to the reasoning of the courts that since administrative agencies perform such a vital function in the processes of government, an absolute privilege should be extended to their functions.
III.
CONCLUSION.

Courts will most likely continue to insist upon some procedural safeguards in administrative proceedings in order to protect the individual
against defamatory statements. The courts feel that these procedural safeguards lessen the danger of defamation in administrative proceedings just
as they do in courtroom proceedings. Whether this is a valid assumption
is open to question. However, when these safeguards are present, an
absolute privilege will usually be extended to the proceedings of the
more important administrative agencies. A blanket extension of an absolute privilege to all administrative proceedings, no matter what their function is, would be most undesirable because of the great possibility of harm
to the individual, especially since the increase in the number and scope
of administrative agencies. For most agency proceedings, the grant of
only a conditional privilege, whereby the defamatory statement must be
made in good faith, would not appear to hamper unduly the administrative
process.
Edward H. Feege
54. See Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896) ; Bigelow v. Brumley, 138 Ohio
St. 574, 37 N.E.2d 584 (1941) ; Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A.2d 892 (1952).
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